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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CONTINENTAL REPUBLIC CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent)
-vs.-

Civil No.
8977

THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Continental Republic Corporation, the plaintiff below and respondent here, and hereinafter referred to as
Continental, brought suit against the Securities Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, for an order requirng the Commission to register
certain securities of Continental. After a pre-trial hearing held on September 4, 1958, the Third Judicial Dis-
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trict Court, in and for Salt Lake County, issued a judglnent and decree dated September 24, 1958, in which it
ordered the Commission to register the securities. The
Commission appeals from that order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Continental is a Utah corporation capitalized for
1,000,000 shares of Class A common stock of a par value
of $1.00 per share, and 2,500,000 shares of Class B common stock of a par value of 1¢ per share. The Articles
of Incorporation (R. 9 to 15) provide that each share
of Class A and Class B stock shall be entitled to one
vote each at any shareholders' meeting. It is further
provided that the Class A common stock shall be entitled
to 100 times the amount paid in dividends as the Class
B stock, and 100 times as much as the Class B stock on
dissolution. This does not constitute a preferred right.
Pursuant to Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953, Continental filed an issuer's application with the Commission,
seeking to register by qualification 500,000 shares of the
Class A common stock to be sold to the public at a price
of $1.00 per share. (R. 19-24). By letter dated December
9, 1957, addressed to Continental's attorney (R. 25), the
Commission denied the application. That letter is quoted
in part as follows:
It appears that the officers of the corporation
have purchased 2,500,000 shares of Class B common at 1¢ per share for whirh they have paid
$25,000. Five hundred [thousand] shares of Class
[A] romn1on is to be offered to the public at $1.00
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per share. Holders of both classes of stock are to
have the one vote for each share; that is, the stockholder of Class A who pays $1.00 for one share
will have the same vote as the holder of a share
of Class B. stock who has paid 1¢ for his one
share. Furthermore, the holders of the Class B.
stock are always to control the corporation and
also to control the Insurance Company and the Finance Company which you expect to establish with
money derived from the proposed public offering.
The promoters put into the corporation
$25,000, the public will invest $500,000 and yet
will hold a minority of the voting power.
The Commission cannot approve such a proposal and the application referred to is denied.
(R. 25).
The Commission made no formal findings of fact, conclusions and order. The above quoted letter constitutes
the Commission's rejection of Continental's application.
By letter dated December 20, 1957 (R. 26), Continental proposed to amend its application, and by letter dated
December 24, 1957 (R. 28), the Commission rejected the
proposed amendment, stating that it did not remedy
the objections the Commission previously made. Thereafter, Continental sought and obtained an order from
the District Court requiring the Commission to register
the securities. The parties hereto stipulated as to essential facts. That stipulation is a part of the record (R. 7
and 8).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED
WITHIN ITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S APPLIC.NTION TO REGISTER THE SECURITIES BY QUALIFICATION.
POINT II.
THE PROPOSED SALE OF STOCK BY RESPONDENT
WOULD TEND TO WORK A FRAUD ON THE PURCHASING
PUBLIC.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED
WITHIN ITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S APPLIC.NTION TO REGISTER THE SECURITIES BY QUALIFICATION.

The primary purpose for creating the Securities
Commission of the State of Utah was that of protecting
the public in the purchase of securities. There are implied
discretionary powers vested in the Commission by virtue
of its creation, its powers and duties. It is evident from
certain penalties prescribed in the act, that the Legislature considerd the potential harn1 and injur~T to the public possible in security sales. It is 1nade a felony to make
a statmnent concerning the sale of securities which is
false or willfully exaggerated or would haYe a tendency
to give a less or greater apparent value to securities or
property than such actually possesses. See Section 61-128, U.C.A. 1953. It is also n1ade a felony for a person to
publish an advertisen1ent by or on behalf of any person '
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who is not registered, Section 61-1-35, or to sell securities
which are non-exempt and not registered, Section 61-1-36.
The Utah Securities statute, Chapter 1, of Title 61,
enacted in 1925, is primarily a merit statute, as distinguished from disclosure statutes, such as the federal
security act; the difference in the two being that in the
former the Commission is granted the power to reject the,
registration if certain conditions and factors are present,
and in the latter the securities will be registered
regardless of their nature or manner of sale, so
long as a full disclosure is made.
As previously indicated, this appeal arose out of the
Commission's rejection of Continental's application for
registration of securities by qualification under the provisions of Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953. That section provides that all securities not entitled to be registered by
notification shall be registered by qualification. It further
provides as follows:
The commssion may require the applicant to
submit to the commission the following information respecting the issuer, and such other information as it may in its judgment deem necessary to
enable it to ascertain whether such securities
shall be registered pursuant to the provisions of
this section : * * *
There follow nine paragraphs specifying information to
be submitted with the application. The last paragraph
of the section provides as follows:
If upon examination of any application the
commission shall find that the sale of security
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referred to therein would not be fraudulent or
tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser, and that
the enterprise or business of the issuer is not
based upon unsound business principles, it shall,
upon the payment of the fee provided in this section, record the registration of such security in the
register of securities, and thereupon such security
so registered may be sold by the issuer, by any
registered agent or any registered dealer who
has notified the commission of his intention so to
do in the manner provided in section 61-1-16,
subject, however, to the further order of the commission as hereinafter provided. Such registration
shall be valid for a period of one year from the
date of entry in the register of securities, unless
sooner cancelled, suspended or revoked by the
commission for good cause after notice to the
issuer of the security.
As the statute above quoted provides, the Commission
may reject an application for registration where it would
be fraudulent, tend to work a fraud, or is based on unsound business principles. It is submitted that the Commissions' discretionary powers to reject applications are
not confined to strict definitions of fraud or unsound
business principles as will be discussed hereinafter.
Section 61-1-11, U.C.~-1. 1953, hereinabove quoted, has
not previously been interpreted by this Court on the issue
raised here. The Utah Securities law is substantially a
copy of the Iowa Securities law, Chapter 502, Code of
Iowa, 1958. ~lan~v of the sections of the two statutes are
identical. In the Iowa Code the counterpart to our Section 61-1-11, and fr01n which the latter was drawn, is
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Section 502.7, Code of Iowa, 1958, formerly section 8581cS. The Iowa statute, Section 502.7, contains the identical
language as that quoted above from Section 61-1-11 of
our Code, see pages 5 and 6 of this brief.
In a 1939 case, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted
provisions of the Iowa statute comparable to the Utah
Securities law. See Independence Fund of North America
vs. Miller (1939 Iowa), 285 N.W. 629. In that case the
Secretary of State (the individual in Iowa occupying the
position similar to the Securities Commission in Utah)
denied the application of a corporation seeking to register certain declarations of trust and agreements by qualification. That case cannot be compared factually with
the instant case, but statements of the court bear strongly
upon the interpretation of the Utah statute. The Iowa
Supreme ·Court affirmed the lower court which had upheld the Secretary of State's action. The court made the
following statement about the Iowa Securities Act in
general:
An examination of the Statute discloses that
it seeks to attain its ends by regulating and licensing the issuer and dealer and inspecting and
licensing the security. In scope it differs from
the acts of Pennsylvania and certain other states
·which license the dealer without requiring the
qualification of the security and from the Statutes
of other jurisdictions some of which require only
that the security be qualified and still others
which are based solely upon fraud and require no
qualification for either dealer or security.
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The Utah act, almost identical with the Iowa statute,
likewise regulates and licenses the dealer and inspects
and licenses the security. The court went on to say:

* * * Of necessity the legislature was compelled
to delegate to the Secretary of State, in his handling of the details of the regulation and enforcement of the act, discretion comparable to the complexities of the situations it was designed to remedy. Otherwise in this and other similar situations
such legislation would be rendered practically
impotent. * * *
Then toward the end of the decision the following significant statement is made:

* * * Code Section 8581-c8 [comparable to section
61-1-11 DCA 1953] directs the Secretary of State
to find whether or not the sale of the security
would be fraudulent or would work or tend to
work a fraud upon the purchaser, or that the enterprise or business of the issuer is not based upon
unsound business principles. Section 8581-c11 authorizes the Secretary of State to forbid the sale
of any security ,,-hen "in his opinion, the sale
thereof would be unfair, unjust or inequitable to
the purchaser thereof."
Although the latter provision appears in the
section relating to registration of dealers and
salesmen, it is plain!~- indicative of the legislative
construction of the forn1er. l'nder such construction the Secretar)- of State n1a~- refuse the registration of a seeurit~- if. in his opinion, it is unfair,
unj u::-;t or inequitable. It is not essential that it be
''fraudulent·· as this word is ordinarilY defined.
Sine<' the Seeretan- of State is thus ~uthorized
to use his judgment it is quite proper that stand-
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ards be established upon which to base such opinion and judgment.***
This language is particularly significant because the
court interprets the statute as giving the Secretary of
State discretionary powers to reject applications to register securities when they are unfair, unjust and inequitable. It is conceded that there are some differences in the
Utah and Iowa security laws and that in some respects
the Iowa Legislature has granted what appears to be
broader powers. However, the statutes are identical in
substance; the Utah statute was patterned after that of
Iowa, they are both enactments for the purpose of protecting the public in the matter of security purposes, and
they are essentially merit statutes. What is most signifi-cant is that the Iowa Court, in construing the same section
of their act as this court is called upon to analyze now,
Section 61-1-11, went beyond the language of the section
and found implied powers in the Secretary of State to
reject the application where it was unfair, inequitable
and unjust.
The securities scheme proposed by the plaintiff's
application is, on its face, unfair and inequitable. The
potential harm to the buying public in such scheme is
apparent on an analysis of plaintiff's application and
articles of incorporation. Two promoters purchased all
of the Class B stock (the 1¢ stock), 1,250,000 shares each.
Their outlay, therefore, of $25,000.00 ($12,500.00 each)
will enable them to excercise complete control over the
policy, operations and management of the corporation.
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The public, who is asked to invest $500,000.00 in the corporation, therefore, contributes, as compared to the two
promoters, 95 percent of the corporate capital, and obtains only 20 percent of the voting power. This approaches a subterfuge. Why are the holders of Class A stock
given ~ny vote; they acquire no effective voting power
thereby. It is a sham which induces the public to believe
they are buying securities possessing voting rights.
It has been argued that this is similar to the issuance
of preferred stock and that such is a common practice
in corporate security issues. But this is not preferred
stock; no preference right is granted, nor does the Class
A stock possess cumulative rights. The provision in the
Articles of Incorporation that holders of Class A stock
are entitled to 100 times the amount of dividends paid on
Class B stock and 100 times the amount paid on distribution is not effective protection. There is no guarantee
that dividends will ever be paid. It is noted that the two
promoters who purchased all of the Class B stock are
also officers of the corporation. It is not uncommon in
small corporations that dividends are never paid because
officers' salaries and administrative expenses consume
all profits. Another potential harn1 is that the promotersofficers could call a 1neeting of stockholders, amend the
Articles of Incorporation, and n1ake an assessment of
all shares of ·Class A stock.
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POINT II.
THE PROPOSED SALE OF STOCK BY RESPONDEN'l'
WOULD TEND TO WORK A FRAUD ON THE PURCHASING
PUBLIC.

Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953, hereinabove discussed,
and quoted in part, includes the provision that the Conlmission may not register securities if the sale of such
would "tend to work a fraud on the purchaser". That
phrase "tend to work a fraud" is not commonly defined
in the texts or the decisions. Obviously it was intended
to have some meaning or it would not have been included;
and it must have a meaning different from "fraudulent"
or the two terms would not both have been included. The
term "tend" has the following synonyms and definitions:
"Stretch", "relate to", "to be directed to or have a tendency, conscious or unconscious, to any end, object or
purpose.'' Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd
Edition. By reason, the phrase means something less than
"fraudulent"; the use of the term "tends" compels that
conclusion. The essence of fraud is misrepresentation.
This phrase therefore might be said to mean tends to
misrepresent.
It is submitted that the proposed scheme goes beyond
the point of unfairness and "tends to work a fraud on the
purchaser." in the following particulars: First, the Class
A stock is advertised and sold as possessing a voting
right, when as a practical matter 83% of the voting stock
is held by two of the promoters. The voting right acquired
therefore by Class A stockholders is meaningless. Second,
the public is also informed that the Class A stock is
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guaranteed to receive 100 times the amount of dividends
and 100 times the amount paid on distribution as the
Class B stock. However, as previously stated, the stock
has no preferred or cumulative right, and more significantly there is no assurance that any dividend will ever
be paid.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
1ower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
GARY L. THEURER
Assitant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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